user has previously been denied, or whether the end-user has previously diverted items received under a general license, a License Exception, or a validated license to unauthorized activities:

- (vii) Whether the export or reexport would present an unacceptable risk of diversion to a nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity described in §744.2(a) of the EAR; and
- (viii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, based on consideration of the following factors:
- (A) Whether the importing country is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear nonproliferation agreement:
- (B) Whether the importing country has all of its nuclear activities, facilities, or installations that are operational, being designed, or under construction under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards;
- (C) Whether there is an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the U.S. and the importing country;
- (D) Whether the actions, statements, and policies of the government of the importing country are in support of nuclear nonproliferation and whether that government is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation;
- (E) The degree to which the government of the importing country cooperates in non-proliferation policy generally (e.g., willingness to consult on international nonproliferation issues); and
- (F) Information on the importing country's nuclear intentions and activities.
- (2) In addition, BIS will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b) of this section for items *not* on the Nuclear Referral List that:
- (i) Require a license on the CCL for reasons other than "short supply;" and

- (ii) Are intended for a nuclear related end-use or end-user.
- (3) For the People's Republic of China, the general licensing policy for applications for those items that would make a direct and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is extended review or denial
- (4) License applications for items described in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined to the People's Republic of China, will be reviewed in accordance with the licensing policies in both paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).
- (c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.
- (d) Nuclear Suppliers Group. Most items on the Nuclear Referral List that require a license under NP Column No. 1 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are contained in the Annex to the "Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology" (the Annex), as published by the International Atomic Energy Agency in INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/ Part 2. The adherents to INFCIRC/254/ Revision 1/Part 2, which includes the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, have agreed to establish export licensing procedures for the transfer of items identified in the Annex. Items that are listed as requiring a license under NP Column No. 2 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are not included in the Annex and are controlled only by the United States.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 70 FR 51252, Aug. 30, 2005; 72 FR 33656, June 19, 2007; 76 FR 4231, Jan. 25, 2011]

## § 742.4 National security.

(a) License requirements. It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, a license is required for exports and reexports to all destinations, except Canada, for all items in

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ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section. A license is required to all destinations except Country Group A:1 and cooperating countries (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS column 2 in the Commerce Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section except those cameras in ECCN 6A003.b.4.b that have a focal plane array with 111,000 or fewer elements and a frame rate of 60 Hz or less. A license is required to all destinations except Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy. Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for those cameras in ECCN 6A003.b.4.b that have a focal plane array with 111,000 or fewer elements and a frame rate of 60 Hz or less and for cameras being exported or reexported pursuant to an authorization described in §742.6(a)(2)(iii) or (v) of the EAR. The purpose of the controls is to ensure that these items do not make a contribution to the military potential of countries in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. License Exception GBS is available for the export and reexport of certain national security controlled items to Country Group B (see §740.4 and Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the

(b) Licensing policy. (1)(i) The policy for national security controlled items exported or reexported to any country except a country in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications unless there is a significant risk that the items will be diverted to a country in Country Group D:1.

- (ii) When destined to a country listed in Country Group D:5 in Supplement No. 1 to Part 740 of the EAR, however, items classified under "600 series" ECCNs will also be reviewed consistent with United States arms embargo policies (§ 126.1 of the ITAR).
- (2) Except for those countries described in paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(7) of this section, the general policy for exports and reexports of items to Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for civilian use or would otherwise not make a significant contribution to the military potential of the country of destination that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.
- (3) To permit such policy judgments to be made, each application is reviewed in the light of prevailing policies with full consideration of all aspects of the proposed transaction. The review generally includes:
- (i) An analysis of the kinds and quantities of items to be shipped;
  - (ii) Their military or civilian uses;
- (iii) The unrestricted availability abroad of the same or comparable items;
  - (iv) The country of destination;
- (v) The ultimate end-users in the country of destination; and
  - (vi) The intended end-use.
- (4) Although each proposed transaction is considered individually, items described in Advisory Notes on the Commerce Control List are more likely to be approved than others.
- (5) In recognition of efforts made to adopt safeguard measures for exports and reexports, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia are accorded enhanced favorable consideration licensing treatment.
- (6) The general policy for Cambodia and Laos is to approve license applications when BIS determines, on a caseby-case basis, that the items are for an authorized use in Cambodia or Laos and are not likely to be diverted to another country or use contrary to the national security or foreign policy controls of the United States.

- (7) For the People's Republic of China (PRC), there is a general policy of approval for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items to civil end-uses. There is a presumption of denial for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items that would make a direct and significant contribution to the PRC's military capabilities such as, but not limited to, the major weapons systems described in Supplement No. 7 to Part 742 of the
- (c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.
  - (d) [Reserved]

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 61 FR 64283, Dec. 4, 1996; 70 FR 67348, Nov. 7, 2005; 72 FR 33656, June 19, 2007; 74 FR 23946, May 22, 2009; 74 FR 68145, Dec. 23, 2009; 78 FR 22721, Apr. 16, 2013]

## §742.5 Missile technology.

- (a) License requirements. (1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to limit the proliferation of missiles, a license is required to export and reexport items related to the design, development, production, or use of missiles. These items are identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section. Licenses for these items are required to all destinations, except Canada, as indicated by MT Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
- (2) The term "missiles" is defined as rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) payload to a range of a least 300 kilometers (km). See §746.3 of the EAR for definition of a "ballistic missile" to be exported or reexported to Iraq.
- (b) Licensing policy. (1) Applications to export and reexport items identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material

- contribution to the proliferation of missiles. Applications for exports and reexports of such items contained in Category 7A or described by ECCN 9A101 on the CCL will be considered more favorably if such exports or reexports are determined to be destined to a manned aircraft, satellite, land vehicle, or marine vessel, in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for such applications. When an export or reexport is deemed to make a material contribution to the proliferation of missiles, the license will be denied.
- (2) The following factors are among those that will be considered in reviewing individual applications.
  - (i) The specific nature of the end-use;
- (ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its contribution to the design, development, production, or use of missiles;
- (iii) The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient country;
- (iv) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country;
- (v) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, or use of missiles that are given in a particular case; and
- (vi) The existence of a preexisting contract.
- (3) Controls on other items. BIS will review license applications, in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, for items not described in paragraph (a) of this section that:
- (i) Require a validated license for reasons other than short supply; and
- (ii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, or use of missiles, or for a facility engaged in such activities.
- (4) License applications for items described in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined for the People's Republic of China, will be reviewed in accordance with the licensing policies in both paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).
- (c) Contract sanctity. The following contract sanctity dates have been established:
- (1) License applications for batch mixers specified in ECCN 1B117 involving contracts that were entered into